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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the 
problem of external effects (externalities). Assessing their two most 
important works, it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for 
an evaluation of total efficiency, while Pigou, with some exceptions, is 
convinced that it is almost always socially desirable to reach marginal 
efficiency through taxes or liability. It is interesting that the economist of 
Chicago, who has elaborated on the renowned theorem, thinks that is not 
desirable to reach efficiency at the margin every time, and that it is 
often preferable to evaluate the total, which indicates the solution that is 
more welfare enhancing. A certain confusion in the work of Coase is 
noticeable. On one hand he criticizes Pigou for statements regarding the 
social desirability of relocating some industries away from the towns, and 
on the other hand, he suggests solutions that give an absolute right for an 
activity that is incompatible with the activity of another subject.  In this way 
he eliminates the possibility of having a solution that is in accordance with 
Coase’s idea, which stresses that any external effect is reciprocal. The 
adjective “reciprocal” means that damage to Y is the consequence of 
limiting the activity of Y in order to allow for the activity of X. The 
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opposite is also true: A benefit for Y causes damage to X.  
Beyond this criticism, Coase’s arguments against Pigou’s tools are 
represented by the famous theorem, according to which a public 
intervention is not necessary in order to obtain efficiency when transaction 
costs are low. However, the theorem is not an idea that can be used to say 
that Pigou’s methods are useless when transaction costs are high. Indeed, 
when transaction costs are high, efficiency cannot be reached through 
negotiations.  Coase, nonetheless, rejects Pigou’s tools for every situation. 
Through a deep examination of the paragraphs of “The Problem of Social 
Costs,” it is understandable why Coase opposes Pigou’s tools. First of all, 
he considers that the remedy consisting in the compensation of the victim. 
To Pigou’s way of thinking, this is a strict liability rule. Coase states that 
the damage is caused by both parties, and, moreover, the amount of the 
damage depends on both parties. He understands that the compensation 
method described by Pigou can bring about moral hazards and, therefore, 
brings about new social costs. 
Since the article was written in 1960, Coase’s theory has been developed 
and has become a pillar of tort law and economics.  
Pigou proposed a tax as an alternative remedy for external effects, which 
does not bring about a behavior of moral hazard, because the victim bears 
the expected costs. However, Coase is diffident in regard to the tax. His 
idea was not developed by other scholars in the subsequent years. Coase 
understands that efficiency should require a tax on the victim, so that the 
victim considers the increase of the costs of precaution for the injurer due to 
creating the nuisance. In other words, Coase understands that the tax does 
not produce the socially optimal activity level of the parties if the costs of 
precaution of the other party are not considered as a component of the tax. 
Therefore, Coase‘s belief is that the tools of Pigou create so many 
problems as to make them inefficient.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Ronald Coase and Arthur Pigou have contributed considerably to the development 
of the  vast field of economic science. Indeed, without their contributions, 
transaction cost economics, the economic analysis of law, and the new welfare 
economics might never have been developed. 
Pigou published his last edition of The Economics of Welfare in 1932.1 Three decades 
later, Coase sent his article on the problem of social cost to the press in 1960.2 
Although the two economists agreed on many aspects, such as the problem of the 
maximization of welfare and the proper functioning of market competition,3 Coase’s 
article comes across as a strong criticism of Pigou’s stance and the tradition that had 
developed around his writings. In fact, Coase strived to highlight a number of 
deficiencies in Pigou’s arguments. He directed many critical comments at Pigou, one 
of which has subsequently been termed “Coase’s Theorem.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Pigou A., The Economics of Welfare, 4
th edition, Macmillan and Co Ltd, London (1932). 
2Coase R., “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3 (1960) now published in Coase R., The 
Firm, the Market, and the Law, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1988). All quotes from Coase are from this 
publication. 
3Ibid., at 95 
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2. THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF EXTERNAL EFFECTS. 
 
 
In order to propose his general view of the problem of external effects, Coase strongly 
emphasized that a negative external effect is reciprocal in the sense that if the 
exercise of an activity is limited, a cost arises out of the non- exercise of this 
activity. Coase stated that Pigou and his followers were not aware of this aspect.  In 
fact, such criticism did not actually concern Pigou and his oral tradition even though 
Coase placed great importance on this comment. 
Pigou proposed taxes or compensation in the case of external negative effects. It is 
clear that he believed that a tax or a duty of compensation limited an activity that 
produced also benefits; otherwise, he would have listed activities that should be 
banned. Pigou imagined that one of his tools would have limited an activity, but only 
limited, because below a certain level of activity, it would be convenient to pay the tax 
or the compensation. However, if it were convenient to pay the tax or the 
compensation, then this would indicate that there was a private benefit greater than the 
tax.  
In a number of cases it seems that Pigou goes against his own philosophy. For 
example, he proposed constructing factories away from towns. In this case, he 
seemingly attributed zero utility to the factories’ activities, which he defined as 
“antisocial.” For Coase this is evidence that Pigou had not recognized the 
concept of the reciprocal nature of the externalities. Nevertheless, Pigou’s 
judgment may be an attempt to evaluate the efficiency on the total, which is similar 
to Coase’s reasoning for other occasions, i.e., without looking a t  the conditions of 
marginal efficiency. In other words it is possible that Pigou, similarly to Coase, 
understood that the condition of efficiency at the margins is not always the most 
efficient solution for a problem of externality, because some new social costs can 
derive, as we will see, if the legal system tries to obtain that condition. Surely, Coase 
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moved beyond Pigou’s ideas with regard to certain tendencies of how to work out 
the evaluation of the welfare on the whole and not on its margins. These tendencies 
were not characteristic of Pigou’s work due to his intention to attenuate the exercise 
of a particular activity that also causes damages without completely eliminating 
the exercise of the activity of the injurer. Instead, the activity of the injurer is 
controlled so that the social marginal benefits coincide with the social marginal costs. 
When Coase viewed total welfare, he also considered the efficiency at the margin, 
because in this way sometimes total welfare is maximized. However, he did not 
believe in Pigou’s tools for welfare maximization, and when he perceived that a 
Pigouvian tool could have the consequence of producing socials costs, he preferred an 
evaluation of the total. It becomes evident that Coase criticizes a method of reasoning 
that he used many times.  
Moreover, Coase does not accept Pigou’s tools, which are the best methods to achieve 
efficiency if we take into account the reciprocal nature of the external effect. In this 
way he refuses those tools that are the natural consequence of the idea of the reciprocal 
nature of external effects, which Coase stresses as a pillar of external effect 
understanding. 
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3 COASE’S ARGUMENTS CRITICIZING PIGOU: THE EQUIVOCAL EXPRESSIONS. 
 
 
As previously mentioned, Coase interpreted Pigouvian thought in the sense that the 
English economist overlooked the reciprocal nature of externalities. Coase 
essentially focused on expressions used by Pigou, e.g., when he suggested that 
certain activities are antisocial and must be expelled from cities 
The adjective “antisocial” undoubtedly is an unfortunate choice,  but it points to 
the base of Pigou’s reasoning, which contains a simple opinion that sometimes an 
activity produces more benefit than another. Therefore, by making an evaluation of 
the totality, as Coase often does, the less useful activity must be excluded in order to 
prevent interfering with the more useful activity. At times, in fact, very rarely, Pigou 
evaluates the totality without verifying the conditions of efficiency at the margin, 
which is interestingly the method used more frequently by Coase. Pigou does not 
explain why he makes use of an evaluation on the total rather than on the margin, 
while Coase gives some justifications, even if it is difficult to understand in a clear 
way all the ideas on which Coase elaborates. 
 We can observe that Coase departs from the idea of the reciprocal nature of external 
effect. 
In the following statement, Coase is still cautious: 
 
George J. Stigler suggests the pollution of a stream. If one supposes that the 
negative effect is that of killing the fish, the problem to be discussed is as 
follows: is the value of the lost fish higher or lower than the contamination of 
the stream? There is hardly any need to say that one has to consider this 
problem both within its totality and within its margin [italics added].1 
This sentence provides evidence that Coase, quoting Stigler, develops the idea that it is 
                                                            
1 Coase R., The Problem of Social Cost,  supra at.96. 
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important to assure the conditions of efficiency of the margin, but his position changes 
in the subsequent pages of “The Problem of Social Cost.”  
 In the significant case of Bass v. Gregory2, Coase is much more pointed. In this 
controversy, the defendant shut off a well from which beer fumes were emanating 
from a vent-hole for the plaintiff’s small beer producing operation. The defendant 
chose this action because he was nauseated by this smell. The plaintiff succeeded in 
winning the case by asserting that he had right of prescription.  
An examination of Coase’s assertions brings the following declaration to mind: It is 
necessary to weigh the harm against the good that can be derived. In Coase’s thinking 
what must be decided is whether the advantages derived from preventing the damage 
is greater than the loss caused by the damage.  
However, Coase in his work denotes a tendency to reason in the same way that Pigou 
reasoned and Coase criticized. It is a way of reasoning that wants to find the best 
solution based on the total and is not concerned with the result of efficiency at the 
margin. 
In writing a comment about the decision he stated: “The economic problem is that of 
deciding which to choose a lower cost for beer and a worsened amenities in 
adjoining houses, or a higher cost of beer and improved amenities.”3 The well from 
which the smell of beer was emanating was connected to an underground channel 
from a small beer producing center. The judge declared that the defendant possessed 
prescription rights and was thus permitted to allow the smell to come out. Coase held 
that the problem in the case of Bass v. Gregory was that the fresh air from the well 
made the production of beer easier, but the sour air expelled by the well made life 
in the adjacent houses less pleasant.. It is important to note that Coase reasons in a 
way that had been previously made the subject of criticism when used by Pigou: he 
considers stopping the activity totally or allowing any level of activity. He does not try 
                                                            
2
Ibid.,  at. 112.  
 
3 Ibid., at 114. 
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to propose a solution that assures the efficiency at the margins. He looks at two 
possible solutions, each at opposite poles. The activity either must be completely 
stopped or it must be considered totally legal. It is the same line of reasoning used by 
Pigou when he suggested moving certain industries outside of the towns. In fact, it is a 
means of providing an evaluation that looks at the total, because an evaluation based 
on the obtainment of efficiency at the margin can determine some other costs so that 
the solution is not the best one, as we will see. But Coase does not give this 
explanation until he starts to speak about the Pigouvian tradition. 
Coase could have raised the following two criticisms that Pigou would possibly 
have made: 1) One must, in fact, decide whether it was possible to dictate certain 
hours during which the fumes could be let out, thereby creating lesser damage, and 
2) One could establish the maximum quantity of air than can be released. Moreover, 
the costs could be minimized by introducing other fine regulations. In other words, 
in this case it would be possible to find prescriptions that guarantee an equilibrium 
between marginal benefits and marginal costs. These are simple questions that could 
generate a solution that equals marginal benefits with marginal costs, but Coase did not 
consider them. The explanation is that Coase does believe that using the tools of Pigou 
to obtain the efficiency at the margin has the consequences that some distortions are 
produced so that the solution is not optimal. 
Coase continues in the article to reason in the same way.  He states: 
 
The problem which we faced in dealing with actions which have harmful 
effects is not simply one of restraining the action of those responsible for 
them. What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is 
greater that the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of 
stopping the action which produced the harm.4 
Coase’s declaration cannot be considered inexact in itself, because alternative social 
                                                            
4 Coase R., The Problem of Social Cost, supra at 132. 
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organizations can provide major or minor social benefits. Nevertheless, it gives the 
idea that Coase does not consider Pigou’s methods useful. Coase does not consider 
Pigouvian tools and does not follow Pigou’s rigorous principle of seeking the 
conditions of efficiency at the margin using compensation for damages or Pigouvian 
taxes. Instead Coase, writing these declarations of principle, is saying the same thing 
the Pigou said when he proposed to take the industries out of the towns. That fact that 
he says that the solution is not restricting an activity, can be interpreted in the sense 
that Coase does not believe in the importance of the necessity of efficiency at the 
margin. 
The last case considered by Coase is in regard to rabbits that go from one piece of 
land to another. This case provided a precedent, which is found in Boulston v. 
Hardy.5 In 1597, an action was brought by one landowner against a neighbor who 
raised conies, and these conies increased the number of rabbits and the damages for 
the actor. The ruling in the Boulston case6 determined that a landowner who harbors 
rabbits can never be liable. Damages remain on the neighbors’ shoulders. Coase 
indicated that it would be undesirable if the legal system fixed the rule of liability at 
one pole, because from an economic point of view, fixing the rule at one pole would 
be inefficient.  Therefore, he states, “Given that transaction costs make arrangements 
of rights impossible unless we know the particular circumstances, we cannot say 
whether is desirable or not to make the man who harbors rabbits responsible for the 
damage committed by the rabbits on neighboring properties.”7 Coase is very clear in 
this statement: The most efficient solution might be one that allows no limits on the 
harboring of rabbits. The cost suffered by the victim should be overlooked and 
efficiency could require a solution at one pole. Loyalty to the idea that since external 
effects are reciprocal an activity must not be banned or allowed totally is abandoned. 
Coase looks at the efficient solution, and does not consider the efficiency at the 
                                                            
5 Boulston v.Hardy, Cro Eliz, 547, 77 Eng. Rep. 216. 
6 R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,  supra at 144 
7 Ibid., at 147. 
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margin. 
So, once the misunderstanding about the statements of Pigou is solved, we can 
consider the arguments of Coase against Pigou’s thought. The first criticism is the 
famous theorem. 
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5. THE COASE THEOREM. 
 
When an activity produces an external effect, Pigou thinks that a tax or a rule of 
liability must be introduced. Coase shows that in situations where transaction costs are 
low, the inefficiencies are resolved in a natural manner. For example, if a 
judgment does not recognize the right of A, which he values at 30, and recognizes 
the incompatible right of B, which he values at 50, the right remains the property of B. 
That is efficient. 
Yet, if the court finds that the right belongs to A, who values it, as previously stated, 
at 30, and does not recognize the right of B, who values it at 50, B acquires the 
right from A. For judges it is not possible to push forward their own economic 
policy, because through negotiations the allocation of rights would always be the 
same. This fundamental observation constitutes the so called “Coase Theorem” and is 
tied to the reciprocal idea of external effects. To view the theorem in a simpler way, 
imagine that the use of the right by A gives a benefit to her of 30 and causes a damage 
to B of 50. If the right is assigned to B, he will not sell the right to A, because A can 
pay the maximum sum of 30 while the exercise of the right causes damage to B that is 
equal to 50. If the right is assigned to A, B suffers a damage of 50, while A has a 
benefit of 30. B will buy the right form A for a price that is between 30 and 50. The 
deal is convenient for both parties. Therefore, without regard to the initial allocation of 
the right, this right will always end to B. The benefit of one entails a cost for the other, 
and if the cost is larger than the benefit, there will be a reallocation of the right. Coase 
shows that damage to A is the consequence of a benefit to B and vice versa.  
In this situation, the criticism of Pigou is that through the negotiation, the efficiency 
is reached, and Pigouvian methods are unnecessary. Pigou clearly stated that an 
activity should not be completely eliminated; but he proposed a tax or a 
compensation to obtain the efficient solution. Pigou did not discover that in situations 
where transaction costs are low, his tools are unnecessary. 
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Pigou did not determine that inefficiency can be eliminated through contracts 
between parties involved. Pigou did not discover what Coase would explain in his 
article. In this sense, as far as the situation in which transactions cost are low, Pigou is 
the loser. 
So the first criticism is that with law transaction cost efficiency is reached through 
negotiations. This result partially explains Coase’s diffidence regarding Pigou’s ideas, 
and, as a consequence of this diffidence, the famous theorem teaches us that Pigou’s 
methods are wrong when transaction costs are low. However, it does not say anything 
about the possibility of using Pigouvian methods when transaction costs are high. 
So why did Coase reject Pigouvian tools in situations of high transaction costs? In 
other words, why did he refuse those tools that assure the efficiency at the margin and 
also when transaction costs are high? 
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6. THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM. 
 
Coase presents cases in which the two Pigouvian systems give poor results. More 
specifically, Coase puts in evidence that the victim, when the legal system states that 
the victim of an activity should be compensated, does not take any kind of precaution 
in order to avoid or mitigate the damage. Indeed Coase explains that the 
externality is the production of the two activities of the two subjects and that the 
amount of the damage depends on both parties. Using the system of Pigouvian 
compensation, the victim is completely ensured against any damage the other 
party can cause, and for this reason nothing is done to avoid or mitigate damages. 
It is possible to say, synthetically, that the Pigouvian tool of compensation brings 
about a behavior of moral hazard on the part of the injured. 
Coase asserts that the victim plays a role in the damages, and that role has a 
significant influence. Indeed, he showed the necessity of being clearly aware of the 
problem with regard to the case of rabbits that trespass onto a neighbor’s property. 
He imagines that the possible solution is twofold. First, the activity must have as a 
consequence, an obligation to compensate the injured, and second, the activity must be 
completely legal. Coase’s reasoning depends on the fact that he comprehends the moral 
hazard problem that can derive from Pigouvian rule of compensation, which is, in other 
terms, the strict liability rule. Undoubtedly, Coase is aware of the inefficiency of tort 
rule (pure strict liability rule) that is not present in Pigou’s arguments. Pigou 
imagined a rule of pure strict liability, and strict liability is the cause of many 
inefficiencies. 
In order to understand Coase’s argument, he would contend that if one were to require 
the owner of the rabbits to pay the full compensation for the damage, the victim would 
ignore the fact that he was also partially responsible for the damage. Coase asserted that 
the negative external effect, in its totality, depends also on the action of the victim.  
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Recent tort doctrine states that the victim must also take precautions in bilateral 
accidents. Coase anticipated an important indication of law and tort law and 
economics. Years later scholars would discover the importance of simple negligence 
rules, rules of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence and other tort 
rules t h a t  are socially desirable because they push victims to take precautions. 
Victims, under the strict liability rule, do not have the incentive to take precautions or 
to control their level of activity. A rule of strict liability pushes the victims to behave 
without considering the possibility to take precautions against the negative effects that 
come from the fields of the neighbor. Efficiency, instead, requires that the victims 
take precautions.  
Coase states, “The reason is not that a man who harbours rabbits is solely responsible 
for the damage: the man whose crops are eaten is equally responsible.”8 Coase 
recognized an important aspect of the problem of precautionary costs that the victim 
should bear . Coase explains that externality affects are reciprocal. At one point he says 
that Pigou was wrong when he said that some industries should be moved out of the 
towns, and at another point he suggests methods to obtain efficiency similar to the ideas 
of Pigou, such as allowing without limits activities that cause damages. Indeed Coase 
maintains that a rule that permits a person to have as many rabbits as the owner wants 
could be efficient. This means that the owner could be allowed to increase the number 
of rabbits until the marginal benefit is zero. Since the neighbors suffer damages, 
accepting the idea that an activity that is incompatible with another one can be pushed 
until marginal cost is zero means that we are not considering the costs for the victim. 
For Coase it is clear that the neighbor suffers a cost when the owner of rabbits puts a 
great number of rabbits on the land, but Coase rejects the possibility that external 
effects are reciprocal, because he understands that is necessary to look at the total rather 
than at the margin to obtain the most desirable results.  
However, this criticism is not sufficient to abandon Pigou‘s ideas. Indeed the other 
                                                            
8 Ibid., at 146 s. 
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Pigouvian tool, i.e. the tax, does not create a problem of moral hazard. For this reason 
the criticism developed by Coase with regard to compensation cannot be applied to 
Pigouvian tax. Coase understands this aspect of Pigouvian tax and develops an 
argument of great importance. However, it is necessary to see whether Coase really 
understands the difference between tax and compensation. He states,  
 
Since it has not been proposed that the proceeds from the tax should go to 
those who suffer the damage, the solution is not the same as that which 
obliges an undertaking to pay compensation for damage to the objects damaged 
by its actions, even if the two solutions were to be treated as identical.9  
 
Coase’s observation is correct, b u t  something must be said in order to clarify his 
opinion. First of all, Coase began his article by examining the hypothesis of 
compensation of damages and then discussed the judgments that he considered 
socially desirable. These judgments assign a right to one party without indemnifying 
the other one. A similar situation is created by a Pigouvian tax, which provides the 
same solution, as in the case in which injurers are not  obliged to pay compensation 
for damages to objects that are damaged as a result of their actions. The second 
aspect that emerges in this way of reasoning is that something very different exists 
between the two tools. With compensation, as we saw, the injured has no interest in 
taking efficient precautions, because she will be totally compensated. Therefore, a 
problem of moral hazard emerges and social costs increase. In the case of the 
Pigouvian tax, however, the injured bears the expected cost (she is not 
compensated) and, therefore, it is in her interest to take efficient precautions. 
Coase’s criticism is of the compensation tool; it is not a criticism of the Pigouvian tax. 
This tool does not create a problem of moral hazard, so it can be used in order to obtain 
efficiency.  
                                                            
9 Ibid, at 151. 
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It is apparent that Coase clearly understands the difference between a tax and a 
compensation, but he rejects the second tool of Pigouvian tradition. He should be in 
favor of the Pigouvian tax. There are some passages in “The Problem of Social Cost” 
that seem to denote a Coase bias against Pigou. If this were true, the analysis of Coase 
should be considered unconvincing. 
Indeed, he seems to rebuff some Pigouvian ideas that he determined to be correct. It 
appears that he tries to find arguments against Pigou’s tradition, even if Pigou’s 
tradition reflects his way of thinking. 
With reference to the problem of the rabbits that invade another’s territory, Pigou 
allows one exception to his conclusion that there is a divergence between private and 
social products. He adds, “ … unless... the two occupiers stand in a relation of landlord 
and tenant, so that compensation is given in an adjustment of the rent.”10 Here Pigou 
applies Coase’s theorem, i.e., transaction costs are low in the case of the landlord 
and tenant and one can thus negotiate until efficient levels are reached. Yet, instead 
of admitting that Pigou’s concept of costs of negotiation is correct, Coase puts forward 
a strong criticism of Pigou, proving that the problems of the rabbits arise generally 
between the landlord and the tenant. In this way, Coase affirms that the transaction 
costs are always high, even in a situation of bilateral monopoly, or he develops a 
criticism because of a bias against Pigou.11  
The injurer and victim, that is, the landlord and the tenant, can reach a mutually 
optimal solution for the problem of the rabbits through the contractual agreement, 
because transaction costs are normally low. This case resembles an application of 
Coase’s theorem in which the costs of transactions are low, thereby making an 
efficient agreement between the parties possible. Nevertheless, Coase does not agree 
with this approach.  
  
                                                            
10 Ibid, at 146 s. 
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7. COASE’S PERSONAL AND UNIQUE INTUITION 
 
 
Up to now, Coase’s thinking has been examined according to the instruments 
already known in the economic analysis of law. Coase is apprehensive regarding 
moral hazard and cannot rely on the tool of strict liability.  We have seen that Coase 
does not agree with Pigou about the Pigouvian tax. We have also seen that some 
arguments suggested by Coase could indicate a bias in Coase’s thinking. Does Coase 
then make a convincing justification to consider Pigouvian tax as not optimal? 
In fact, Coase has an exceptional intuition about the use of the Pigouvian tax that 
must be further elaborated on by scholars. For example, he imagines a factory that 
has to pay 100 for the pollution it produces. But it can install a filter that costs 90. 
The choice of installing the filter appears to be the efficient solution. Nevertheless, 
it might not be. If the neighbors can move at the cost of 40, it would be more 
efficient for them to move rather than the factory purchasing and installing the 
filter. So, it would be efficient if these residents had to pay a tax equal to the cost of 
precautions at the factory; otherwise they would choose to stay there without 
considering the cost to the factory.12 In this situation a Pigouvian tax does not 
produce an efficient result. 
Coase’s presented problem has wider implications. Should the injurer pay the 
precaution costs of the victim? If the injurer pays, she will bear the entire total 
social costs, so t h e  level of activity will be efficient. Nevertheless, Coase 
understands that the victim should bear the cost of precaution of the injurer and so 
two taxes would be necessary.  
Coase’s concepts are very important. Only if victims pay for the costs of precaution 
that they cause to the injurer will they internalize all social costs. The same is true 
                                                            
12  Ibid., at  151. 
18 
 
for injurers. 
In conclusion it is important to consider that Coase puts forth that a party bears all 
social costs only if she also bears the costs of precaution of the other party; 
otherwise, her private costs do not equal social costs and the level of activity is 
excessive. 
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8. THE VARIOUS INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY 
 
 
Prior to passing judgment on the instruments to correct the negative external 
effects, we should state that each of the authors in question offers two distinct 
methods. Pigou proposes compensation for damages and the Pigouvian tax; in 
contrast, Coase proposes negotiation between the parties and, even if he does not 
state so expressly, the evaluation of the total welfare of two incompatible 
activities. Even Pigou sometimes evaluates activities on the total. As for Coase, it 
might seem surprising that the author who has shown how the conditions of marginal 
efficiency can be achieved through negotiation and has developed the idea of the 
reciprocal nature of an external effect should then admit that the evaluations must 
be done within the total. The number of cases that Coase mentions is considerable, 
thereby seemingly confirming this conviction. As for Pigou, it could be surprisingly that 
economists who want to assure efficiency at the margins suggest looking at the total. 
However, both thinkers understand that looking at the margin is not always desirable, 
and a judgment based on the total is sometimes socially desirable. 
 
 
 
9.   CONCLUSION. 
 
In his renowned article Coase criticizes the Pigouvian tradition. Many ideas are 
convincing, but his pessimism toward Pigouvian tools and their efficiency seems 
sometimes the consequence of a bias against Pigou. He considers some of Pigou’s 
statements regarding some industries that could be antisocial, and states that the 
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external effect is reciprocal. For this reason an activity cannot be said to be antisocial. 
However, in the course of his reasoning Coase becomes more prone to make 
evaluations based on the total than Pigou, and making evaluations on the total 
means that the condition of efficiency at the margin is not respected and so an 
activity can be banned or fully allowed. In other words the principle of the reciprocal 
nature of external effect is abandoned many times by Coase. 
Coase determined that the well-known theorem makes Pigouvian tools useless in 
reaching efficiency. Indeed efficiency is reached through negotiations. However, the 
theorem is not an argument against Pigou’s methods when transaction costs are 
high. Indeed in these situations parties cannot negotiate. 
Nonetheless Coase rejects Pigou methods. He discovers two problems with Pigouvian 
methods. In regard to compensation, the Chicagoan economist understands that a 
problem of moral hazard emerges. With this possibility of social loss, the 
compensation method does not bring efficiency. With respect to the tax, Coase 
needs to find other reasons against this method, because using this method does not 
compensate the victim. 
Coase is of the belief that the Pigouvian tax is not sufficient if a legal system wants to 
promote efficiency. Indeed, with a single tax on the injurer the victim does not 
consider the cost of precautions that the injurer must bear. It is possible that the cost 
of precaution is larger than the cost of giving up the activity by the victim. So Coase 
understands that two taxes are necessary. More generally we can say that efficiency 
is obtained if parties also internalize the costs of precaution of the other party. The 
single Pigouvian tax does not promote efficiency. 
There are fields that could be subject of important research in the future. It would be 
interesting to study if, theoretically, a tax really must be asked to victims of a negative 
externality in order to control their level of activity and, practically, if this solution is 
possible. Second, it’s important to see if inefficiency asks for a tax on the injurer that 
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is not only equal to expected damage but of the sum of the expected cost as well as 
the victim’s cost of precaution. So the same reasoning should be valid for both 
injurers and victims. Law and economics scholars, until now, do not have answers to 
these questions. 
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